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Introduction 
In 1940, Melville Herskovits published what may be the first textbook in economic 
anthropology.  Frank Knight, a prominent economist of the time, wrote a lengthy and critical 
review of Herskovits’ book, which was published in 1941 together with a rejoinder by 
Herskovits.  This paper summarizes the main points of this exchange and attempts to put them 
into a methodological perspective. 
This paper aims to shed light on the early history of the relationship between economics 
and anthropology.  I will specifically point at some of the limitations that I perceive in each 
author’s perspective.  If these respective limitations are typical of subsequent scholars of both 
disciplines (whether this is true is a question beyond the scope of this paper), then some of the 
roots of the intellectual gulf separating the two social sciences may be found here.  (This may be 
true in spite of Knight’s idiosyncracies.) 
There are three additional reasons why the Herskovits – Knight debate is of interest. 
First, both authors take methodology very seriously.  To take Knight: “From the very 
beginning of his career Knight had a strong philosophical inclination, and an equally strong 
presumption that other economists should share this inclination.  For example, in 1925 he wrote 
that “one who aspires to explain or understand human behavior must be, not finally but first of 
all, an epistomologist” (Hammond 1991, p.360). 
Second, both authors share the purpose of promoting the interrelations of the social 
sciences.  This renders their ‘disconnect’ even more poignant.  Knight starts his otherwise critical 
review of Herskovits (1940) by stating that the book is “an able pioneer effort in a field which 
has long been crying for cultivation.  That field … is the interrelations of the different social 
                                                    
1  Thanks are due to Steve Cullenberg for insightful comments.  
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science disciplines, and the objectives clearly in mind of the author are more effective 
collaboration, and less mutual misunderstanding and criticism, between the workers in the 
different branches of social science.”  The purpose of Knight’s critique of Herskovits (1940) is 
“to contribute something to the promotion of the cause in the interest of which the book … was 
written” (Knight, p.508). 
Third, the confrontation between Knight and Herskovits provides an interesting contrast 
between ‘deductivist’ and ‘inductivist’ (my terms) conceptions of economic theory. 
 
Knight and Herskovits on the Definition of Economics 
  Here, I use the word definition in the sense of ‘first sketch of a conception’.  Gradually, 
as this paper progresses, Knight/s and Herskovits’ conceptions of economics will be unfolded. 
  Herskovits (p.46) quotes, and implicitly endorses, Marshall’s (1938) textbook definition 
of economics: “Political Economy or Economics is the study of mankind in the ordinary business 
of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with 
the attainment and with the use of material requisites of well-being.”  This definition is evidently 
broad enough to include the study of the economic organization of any society.  But, Herskovits 
charges, in Marshall’s textbook the promise of breadth implicit in his definition in by no means 
realized.  Marshall’s is essentially a discussion of price and market phenomena – aspects of our 
economic system that are not quite as dominant in other societies.  Herskovits cites Marshall’s, 
Keynes’, Marx’ and general equilibrium (as enunciated by Hicks) theories as prominent 
examples of his thesis that economic theory as it has developed is not applicable to other, non-
literate cultures. 
  Before I outline Knight’s response on the definition issues, it is necessary to point at a 
slight terminological confusion in Knight’s text.  A few times, Knight appears to use the terms 
economics and economic theory interchangeably.  This can be understood if we bear in mind the 
fact that Knight, writing from the standpoint of an “economic theorist” (p.508), is called to the 
defense of economic theory – in the face of criticism from Herskovits and other empirically-
minded social scientists.  However, in Knight’s scheme, there is a definite role for a more 
empirical economics – this becomes clear when he points at the “categorical differences between 
economics as an exposition of principles … and as a descriptive exposition of facts” (p.516).  
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  To Herskovits’ charge that economics does not live up to expectations of broadness 
raised by a definition such as Marshall’s, Knight counters that although Herskovits takes 
Marshall’s to be the definition of economics, it is not: Marshall’s definition does not correctly 
represent the modern science of economics.  In Knight’s judgment, Marshall’s treatment of 
methodology is confused: “But the most careful study of Marshall will hardly yield any clear 
conception of the nature and objectives of economics as an analytical science” (p. 509).  For 
Knight, the beginning of any rational approach to economic problems must be the recognition 
that there are universal principles of “economy” – as indeed Herskovits recognizes (see section 
on universals, below).  Thus, Knight does not regard Marshall’s focus on the “modern” economy 
as a vice.  Knight (p.510) believes that the habit of economists to write predominantly about 
concepts and situations relevant to our own culture misleads no one and hardly calls for defense. 
  Knight’s main objection to Marshall’s definition is that it includes too much.  According 
to Knight, a satisfactory definition should certainly indicate (1) a hierarchy, according to 
generality, of principles, and (2) the vast range of subject matter to be excluded.  A definition 
like that of Marshall would include technology and all the empirical details of “economic” 
activity, i.e. virtually all activity over the whole world and over all time. 
 
Knight’s Conception of Economic Theory as a Deductive Science 
  Knight envisages a unique methodological role for economic theory in the ensemble of 
social sciences: “The very first “crying need” of social science in general,, at the present juncture 
in history, is clarification of the old, old question of the relations between induction and 
deduction… [T]o no small extent this means in practice the relation between other social 
sciences and economic theory.  For the latter is the one social science which effectively uses 
inference from clear and stable abstract principles, and especially intuitive knowledge, as a 
method.  In contrast with it, all other sciences are empirical, including those which use the word 
“economics” (or “economic”) in their designation – though it should go without saying that no 
science can be at once social in any proper sense and empirical in at all the sense of the physical 
sciences.  This relationship between observation, induction from observations, and inference 
from “a priori” principles forms the very pivot of the problem of collaboration between the social 
sciences, and especially of the collaboration between economic theory and the “quasi-empirical”  
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sciences of history, sociology, and anthropology, including institutional – one might say 
anthropological – economics” (pp. 511-2). 
  Thus, in Knight’s conception, economic theory is the only non-empirical social science; 
contrary to the other social sciences, it focuses on deduction – more specifically, on construction 
of theories based on “Economic Man”, i.e., the economic aspect of behavior.  Knight’s 
conception of economics as a deductive science is thus grounded in his conception of Economic 
Man. 
  In Knight’s scheme, Economic Man is only an aspect of human behavior.  Knight (pp. 
512-3) points out that at least four or five “fundamental” categories (i.e., interpretative aspects or 
levels) of social phenomena have to be recognized: (1) Physical mechanism; (2) the biological 
view of man – the distinctive notion here is unconscious teleology (this includes a considerable 
range, from (2a) the plant level, through (2b) the instinctive (animal) level; perhaps level (3) 
should be included here); (3) the “institutional” aspects of human life itself (perhaps to be 
recognized as a distinct level); (4) economic rationality  – the deliberate, problem-solving, 
planned use of means to given ends; and, finally, (5) “higher” rationality, involving deliberation 
about ends. 
  The fourth and fifth levels are virtually universal in human conduct; together they 
constitute the aspect of conscious purpose, or rationality.  Knight recognizes that the fourth level 
– purely economic behavior – in which ends are given and only the use of means in realizing 
them is “problematic”, is rather an analytic abstraction.  Economic theory focuses exclusively on 
this fourth level, but we should not forget that social phenomena are never confined to just one 
aspect.  Crucially, in Knight’s conception, the various social science disciplines do not study 
distinct phenomena, but rather distinct aspects of the same social phenomena.
2 
  Underlying Knight’s deductivist conception of economic theory is a dual interpretation of 
Economic Man as a conceptual as well as normative ideal: “Economics, in the usual meaning, as 
a science of principles, is not, primarily, a descriptive science in the empirical sense at all.  It 
“describes”  economic behavior and uses the concept [of economic behavior] to explain the 
workings of our modern economic organization and also to criticize and suggest changes.  It is, 
                                                    
2 Note, however, that the first two categories refer to natural sciences; notice also that anaother way of categorizing 
aspects of social phenomena is to have them correspond to the social sciences: the psychological aspect, the social 
aspect, the political aspect, etc.  Actually, Knight’s list of levels of “social” phenomena might be m ore appropriately 
named a list of levels (or aspects) of individual behavior.  
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of course, of some interest, in connection with the description, to point out contrast between 
economic behavior and actual behavior, in our own and other culture settings, which does not 
conform to the principles as stated.  But the interest in the contrast itself arises primarily out of 
the fact that the conceptual ideal of economic behavior is assumed to be, at least within limits, 
also a normative ideal, that men in general, and within limits, wish to behave economically, to 
make their activities and their organization “efficient” rather than wasteful.  This fact does 
deserve the utmost emphasis; and an adequate definition of the science of economics, as treated 
in modern textbooks, might well make it explicit that the main relevance of the discussion is 
found in its relation to social policy, assumed to be directed toward the end indicated, of 
increasing efficiency, of reducing waste.  This practical objective requires that the discussion 
deal with principles as they operate in the setting of our own institutions…” (pp. 510-1). 
 
Knight’s Methodological Perspective 
  Knight is an ardent anti-positivist: “Knight planted his feet firmly in opposition to a tide 
that swept over both philosophy and economics during the first part of this century.  This was the 
positivist quest for science based on quantification and measurement, on empirical verification of 
hypotheses, and free of normative values [and] metaphysics…” (Hammond, p.539).  In Knight’s 
eyes, the positivists are wrong about both social and natural sciences.
3  Knight sees 
“metaphysical” concepts such as cause, motive, and force, as indispensable to science, in direct 
contradiction to the positivist conception of science. 
  Moreover, Knight chides positivism for unduly restraining imaginative thought attentive 
to the whole of experience, including its “elusive, unverifiable ingredients”; “unscientific or 
extra-scientific” modes of thought have “a vital function in scientific work”.  Thus “the 
positivistic insistence on making science purely scientific, is detrimental to all science, and 
especially so to social science; and in the fields of the latter, moreover, positivism has been 
developed in its crudest and most extreme forms.”
4 
  Knight repeatedly pronounces the instrumentalist view that the aim of science is to 
uncover mechanisms of causality, thus enabling prediction of the future, in order to make human 
                                                    
3 Hammond (p.361), attacking the interpretation that Knight thought the positivists were right about physics, but 
wrong about economics. 
4 From an unpublished manuscript of Knight (Hammond, p.363).  
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conduct more intelligent.  Yet by the positivist canon – as portrayed by Knight – any search for 
causal mechanism must be extra-scientific; all science can accomplish is to discover empirical 
regularities.
5 
  A central metaphysical concept used in economic theory is motive.  Knight holds that 
motive is as indispensable to economics as force is to mechanics.  For both sciences positivism 
suggests that concepts such as these are suspect since they are not observable.  Knight argues 
that practicing scientists will never be content with trying to find patterns in observable entities.  
But Knight does not oppose quantitative analysis as such.  He only opposes narrowing science to 
nothing more than measurement and statistical analysis. 
  A major methodological adversary of Knight is Hutchison, whose (1938) Significance 
and Basic Postulates of Economic  Theory introduces logical positivism to economic 
methodology: “Hutchison’s quest was to make economic scientific in the sense in which the 
Vienna Circle had delimited the border between science and philosophy… [F]or Hutchison a 
self-evident truth could only be a tautology – a definitional statement with no connection to 
empirical reality.  And science has little to do with tautology and much to do with empirical 
evidence” (Hammond, p.368).  In Hutchison’s scheme analytic statements (mainly tautological 
if/then statements) did have a role, but he thought that synthetic (in principle empirically 
falsifiable or verifiable), not analytic, statements6 are the stuff of genuine science.  For 
Hutchison, the methods of introspection and Verstehen, relied on in Robbins’ (1935) 
methodology for verification of the fundamental propositions, are suspect because they are 
solipsistic and subject to rationalization. 
  Knight’s review of Hutchison (1938) scorns the latter’s positivism, i.e. Hutchison’s 
tendency to place Science (with a capital S) on a pedestal and to demand from economics that it 
regard human beings as objects of nature, and ignore, their motives, thus entirely neglecting the 
type of knowledge which is crucial to economic theory: “At the heart of Knight’s critique is his 
analysis of types of knowledge in science.  Hutchinson had identified two types of knowledge: 
factual knowledge of the external world, and logical or mathematical knowledge.  Knight 
                                                    
5 Knight argues against the positivist view by adducing the classic billiard ball example: “The scientist would have 
to say, one ball stops moving and the other begins to move, and that is all we know about it.  But is it all?  Try as we 
may, we cannot think of the phenomenon in these terms alone… The moving ball encounters a resistance, which it 
must overcome with a push, and we cannot put this of the incident out of our minds” (Knight, quoted by Hamilton, 
p.367). 
6 See Caldwell (1994, p.13).  
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countered that there are three, and that the type omitted by Hutchinson is where the most 
important methodological issues for economics lie.”
7  Knight argues that knowledge of human 
conduct is different from the first two types in some crucial respects.  According to Knight, the 
role of introspection in addition to looking at outward manifestations in people’s actions gives 
knowledge of this third type an epistemological security greater than that of knowledge of the 
first type. Yet this knowledge is not empirically testable to the extent that the knowledge of the 
non-human external world or of mathematics and logic is.  This is because outward physical acts 
of humans are not perfect correspondents of their motives (Hamilton, p.372).  Thus, rather than 
being subject to testing, Knight’s Economic Man is grounded in intuition: “The principles of 
economy are known intuitively; it is not possible to discriminate the economic character id 
behavior by sense observation; and the anthropologist, sociologist, or historian seeking to 
discover or validate economic laws by inductive investigation has embarked on a “wild goose 
chase.”  Economic principles cannot even be approximately verified – as those of mathematics 
can be, by counting and measuring” (Knight, p.512). 
  A major methodological ally of Knight is MacIver, who in his treatise Social Causation 
(1942), compares social causation with physical and biological causation. Knight’s (1943) 
response to the book is largely one of agreement.  MacIver outlines four types of causality: (1) 
Physical causality; (2) causality of organic being; (3) psychological, or more precisely, 
motivational causality; and (4) causality of social nexus.  MacIver portrays the philosophical 
quest for objective certainty as futile, and the rejection of less than certain knowledge as 
perverse.  The demand for complete objective verification is especially futile in the social 
sciences, where much of the subject matter is inevitably subjective.  Yet objectification does 
have an important role for the social scientist.  That role is twofold: to provide clues in the search 
for causes, and to eliminate purported but not actual causes.  According to MacIver, given 
limitations on certainty and given the constant flux in human nature and human institutions, the 
quest for causal knowledge forever remains incomplete, although progress is made in uncovering 
and understanding causes.  So MacIver’s social scientist faces a task that is iterative and 
unending (Hammond, p.376). 
 
                                                    
7 Hammond, p. 370. Knight criticized Hutchinson’s treatment of the two types of knowledge as well.   
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Knight on the Relations between Economics and Anthropology 
  Knight (p.522) states that his review of Herskovits (1940) has the sole purpose of 
“making some constructive contribution to the problem of collaboration between social science 
disciplines in a particular case – anthropology and economics – where the opportunity and 
perhaps the need for collaboration is especially obvious.”  Does this mean that he sees substantial 
mutual benefits for the economist and the anthropologist in learning about each other’s insights? 
  Knight does not make, or try to make, a strong case for the potential value of 
anthropology for economics.  He asserts that, when economists compare our own and more 
primitive economies, it usually makes little or no difference whether the comparisons are 
“anthropologically authentic” (i.e., refer to the real world) or not.  Moreover, he claims that 
while “it would seem to be definitely requisite in the teaching of economics to bring out 
principles affecting our own economic institutions by means of comparisons between our own 
and ‘simpler’ societies”, at the same time, it is “out of the question to make the comparison refer 
to any particular society or social type as reported by anthropological research.”  Knight thus 
admonishes teachers and writers in economics to make comparisons only to a “hypothetical” 
primitive society (p.516). 
  Knight does consider it “highly desirable on general grounds for economists to know 
more about the facts of economies other than their own.”  Such knowledge would be indirectly 
useful “in suggestion of facts, relations, and principles in one’s own economic system which 
might otherwise escape observation.”  Knight does not see a need for the economist’s factual 
knowledge about ‘primitive’ economies to be accurate.  In his eyes, a good economist certainly 
needs the “broadening” effect of travel and historiographic and fictional literature –  knowledge 
of scientific anthropology will be useful in much the same way (p.517). 
  There is an asymmetry in Knight’s perceived mutual benefits of more interaction between 
economists and anthropologists: He discerns a greater need of anthropologists for insights 
emanating from economic theory than vice versa.  Knight claims that the chief requisite for a 
better mutual understanding between economists and anthropologists (including Herskovits!) is 
that the latter should understand the difference between economics as a non-empirical exposition 
of principles and as a descriptive exposition of facts.  An adequate exposition of facts requires an 
understanding of principles, while the need for facts in connection with the exposition of 
principles is far more tenuous (p.516).  Knight perceives the main cause for social scientists’  
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misunderstanding of economic methodology to be a desire to emulate the natural sciences: “The 
tragic failure of social scientists in all branches to see that the disciplines and ‘approaches’ are 
complementary and that the problem is more effective co-operation, not mutual destruction, is 
merely an aspect of the naïve positivism consequent upon the spectacular success of the natural 
sciences … [which] by a false analogy … has inspired a misdirected endeavor to apply the same 
empirical categories in the field of social phenomena, where the relevant data and the problems 
are of an entirely different character.  The resulting prejudice against intuitive knowledge and 
against deductive reasoning is the root of the main difficulties in the way of social sciences 
becoming either true or useful” (p.516).  This is why emphasizing the epistemological 
differences between the natural and social sciences (outlined in the previous Section) is such a 
high priority to Knight. 
 
Herskovits’ Inductivism 
  In his rejoinder, Herskovits rejects Knight’s deductivism, stating that “the first 
commandment of science in general [is] that only through constant and continuing cross-
reference between hypothesis and fact can any understanding of problems and valid 
interpretations of data be had” (p.524).  Though he acknowledges that deduction has its proper 
role in science, he does not accept Knight’s conception of economics as a non-empirical science 
based on intuitively known abstract principles. 
  Thus, Herskovits is critical of Knight’s proposal that “in economic exposition” it “usually 
makes little or no difference whether the comparisons are anthropologically authentic or not.”  A 
statement such as this makes Herskovits feel that perhaps economists will persist, however 
anthropologists phrase their findings, in living in “the world of logical unreality,” disregarding 
those findings.  Knight claims that for the teaching and writing of economics a hypothetical 
comparison, i.e. between our own and a hypothetical primitive society should be made.  
Herskovits’ conviction is that “where comparisons must be made in the teaching and writing of 
economic theory and principles, a fanciful picture of human life that is unlike any human 
existence known to us is bad pedagogy and bad scholarship… My point of view concerning 
scientific method is that findings must be based on fact; and that to depart from reality is to 
vitiate the tenability of conclusions and later statements of policy that may be based on them” 
(pp. 526-7).  
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  Any methodologically conscious scholar making use of induction will have to formulate 
an answer to the problem of induction, or ‘Hume’s problem’: “No rational (i.e., formally logical) 
justification of induction is possible” (Caldwell, p.41).  Herskovits understands that there exists 
no all-purpose formally logical procedure for deriving theories from data.  Rather, the scientist 
had a “flash of insight” connecting data and theory.  What differentiates the scientist from the 
non-scientist is “the way such intuitive flashes are used, rather than the fact that they are used… 
For the [non-scientist], the flash is the answer; for the scientist, it but indicates the outlet of a 
road to be traversed in search for the truth.”  But Knight, by relying on the intuitive notion of 
Economic Man, “exalt[s] the intuitive flash into the method best employed” (Herskovits, pp. 
524-5). 
 
Implicit in Herskovits’ Critique: Ideal of Universality of Science 
  Implicit in Herskovits’ critique of economics and of Knight’s methodological position is 
a preference for a definition of economics that includes the study of non-modern, non-literate 
economies into the subject matter if economics.  Why?  As Knight, Herskovits regards 
economics as a (social) science.  The ideal embodied in Herskovits’ critique is that science 
should aim for (maximum) universality.  Economics has not lived up to this idea: “Economics 
derives its data not only from our own culture, but, except for economic history, from this culture 
as it exists today.  Anthropology, on the other hand, ranging the peoples of the nonliterate world, 
presents materials having to do with all phases of social activity in civilizations of all kinds” 
(p.42). 
 
Herskovits’ Method: Universals and Taxonomies 
  Herskovits’ method begins by looking at the real world, at the widest possible range of 
data falling within the subject matter of economics, thus including non-modern, non-literate 
economies.  Herskovits’ method then looks for “universals”  – fundamental categories all 
economies have in common – and, of course, for differences between economies and 
classifications of them according to these differences.  An important question here is whether the 
differences are discrete or continuous.  The next step then is to uncover causal mechanisms or 
tendencies, in particular universal ones.  
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  According to Herskovits, a unified treatment of modern and non-modern economies is 
justified by basic features shared by all economies: “If we recognize that a difference of degree 
rather than kind exists between most of our economic institutions and those of other peoples, the 
unity of the data concerned with the problem of economizing must be apparent” (p.42).  
Universals include preferences, scarcity (no society has been discovered wherein goods produced 
satisfy all wants of all consumers), rational choice (this is problematic and will be discussed 
below); fundamental categories of production factors – natural resources, man-power, capital 
equipment, and technical knowledge; and the stages of economic processes: allocation of 
resources among productive ends; production; distribution of goods among consumers; and 
consumption. 
  Herskovits (pp. 8-12) conceives of the totality of economic systems as lying on a kind of 
continuum.  At one pole we find the simplest economies, in which the margin between available 
resources and physical survival is slender indeed.  But these simplest economies are few in 
number.  They shade imperceptably into intermediate societies. 
  Herskovits (pp. 13-4; 34-5) then proceeds to point out (gradual) differences between 
economic systems of varying complexity.  For example, in the simplest economic systems, no 
pecuniary factor enters; in intermediate societies, the entrepreneurial function is still at a 
minimum, production and distribution involve little of the profit motive, and labor is only in 
special instances for hire.  To the extent that the market in intermediate societies exists, it is a 
mechanism that facilitates the exchange of goods between members of different communities 
rather than between those who belong to the same group. 
  Large parts of Herskovits’ work are devoted to detailed descriptions of the great variety 
of allocative, productive, and distributive systems in non-literate economies.  Herskovits’ efforts 
are thus to a large extent descriptive and taxonomic.  It is, however, methodologically interesting 
that insofar as Herskovits attempts to explain phenomena, he often relies on the maximization 
principle. 
 
Herskovits and the Maximization Principle 
  Herskovits believes in the cross-cultural validity of the rationality postulate: “The 
principle of maximizing satisfaction [through] conscious choice between scarce means is valid 
because we find that this occurs in all societies” (p.24).  Herskovits and Knight agree that  
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maximizing satisfaction is a valid universal principle, but more particular and less general 
propositions have questionable validity in cultures other than our own (Knight, p.510).  For 
instance, Herskovits (p.16) considers a person who, confronted with a problem beyond his means 
of solving, employs the services of diviner, to be acting rationally. 
  Here we have an example of the great flexibility of the maximization hypothesis, if this is 
stated as “All agents maximize something,” where the “something” is understood to be utility 
(Boland 1981).  For its believers, this hypothesis can be used to explain any human action.  It 
cannot be falsified, since it is an existential statement (the “something” part); nor can it be 
verified, since it is a universal statement (the “all” part) as well. 
  Later criticism of Herskovits from within anthropology shows that while this statement is 
neither verifiable nor falsifiable, it is meaningful, in the sense of being neither empty nor self-
evident: A significant group of scholars disagree with it.
8 
  Herskovits appears to be aware of the fact that the maximization hypothesis cannot be 
grounded in observation nor subjected to empirical test, but he does not discuss the possible 
tension between it and his inductivism.  Clearly, in practice, Herskovits’ method is not 
exclusively induction from empirical data. 
 
Herskovits’ Critique of Radical Methodological Individualism 
  Herskovits’ belief that theories should be based on data is the basis for his rejection of 
Economic Man.  Although Herskovits does not define this term, he certainly does not equate 
with the rationality postulate, since he believes in the latter.  Probably he sees Economic Man as 
a combination of rationality and social atomism, i.e., for Herskovits “Economic Man” is virtually 
synonymous with radical methodological individualism.  According to Herskovits, the use of the 
concept of Economic Man may have been defensible in the past as (quoting Knight, p.525) 
“merely an analytical, especially terminological device for referring to the economic aspect of 
behavior, an aspect universal to all behavior in so far as it is purposive,” perhaps even necessary 
if clarity of thought was to be achieved.  But, argues Herskovits, its continued use is becoming 
less and less defensible as research using data concerning human societies all over the world 
(including his book) consistently indicates that no such creature has ever existed. 
                                                    
8 See, for example, the paradigmatic controversies in anthropology described in Plattner (1989).  
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  Herskovits (pp. 61-2) quotes approvingly K.F. Walker who points out that a major 
difference between economics and anthropology is that anthropologists are focused on the 
community rather than the individual.  They view society as a system of mutually dependent 
elements, and emphasize the influence of social forces on behavior.  The neoclassical economist, 
on the other hand, begins by theorizing rational behavior of isolated individuals, and then 
assumes that the individual members of a social group behave the same way.  Economic Man is 
not a social animal and radical methodological individualism excludes society.  Economic 
relations are impersonal.  In Herskovits’ and Walker’s critique, the social aspect of neoclassical 
economic theory is best pictured as a number of Crusoes interacting through the market 
exclusively.  The economic relation is neither one of co-operation nor one of exploitation, but is 
completely non-moral, non-human.  The failure of neoclassical economic theory to present man 
as a social animal is the basis of anthropologists’ (and some economists’) discontent with 
economic theory. 
  Herskovits emphasizes that economic analysis of non-literate economies must take into 
account their cultures: “[A]ny analysis of the schedule of wants of a given society which projects 
these wants against the supply of goods and services available to satisfy them must be 
supplemented by introducing a third term into the equation; the cultural definition of wants and 
the conventions that dictate how and when they are to be regarded as adequately satisfied.  It is 
in terms of these factors that we will consider the economic systems of nonliterate, non-machine, 
and often, non-pecuniary peoples treated in this book” (p.8).  In the process of “enculturation”, 
occurring mainly during childhood, modes of conceptualizing and evaluating are learned –  and 
learned so thoroughly that, for the most part, they are taken for granted by the individual, and 
form the basis for judgments of all sorts (p.21).  Thus, “enculturative conditioning” forms the 
principal basis for choice, and “[t]he question of rationality … poses itself: rational in terms of 
what system of thought and behavior?”  (p.22) In sum, Herskovits claims that people are rational 
in terms of their own culture. 
 
Herskovits’ Moderate Methodological Individualism 
  Herskovits sees himself as occupying a middle position on a methodological continuum, 
one extreme of which is radical individualism, while the other extreme entirely ignores 
individual decision-making.  Thus, to his critique of radical methodological individualism,  
 
14 
Herskovits adds the qualifier, “Yet the individual cannot be left out of the picture, for all forms 
of social behavior, in the final analysis, must be referred to the behavior of individual members 
of a given society in specific situations,” followed by the warning: “This is why we must be on 
our guard against permitting the pendulum of reaction against the older point of view to swing to 
a point where we reify the common elements in the behavior of individuals into a construct that 
is conceived as existing by and of itself… All choices, that is, however they may be influenced 
by considerations of social standing, social claims, and social assets, are ultimately the choices of 
individuals” (p.7).  Herskovits summarizes his position as follows: “In short, we must not reject 
Economic Man only the substitute Society as an exclusive formula for understanding economic 
behavior and as a base-point for analysis… The economic unit, we must conclude, is the 
individual operating as a member of society, in terms of the culture of his group” (p.8). 
 
Herskovits’ Critique of Ethnocentrism 
  Herskovits’ emphasis on enculturation naturally leads him to embrace cultural relativism 
and warn against the danger of ethnocentrism: “This relativistic approach to the comparative 
study of economic behavior and institutions provides the epistemological foundation essential if 
the differences between the different ways of life are not to be analyzed and assessed in terms of 
principles that derive from a single culture – in this case, our own.  The point of view this latter 
engenders is called ethnocentrism…  This is a habit of thought that must be guarded against if 
understanding of any modes of any modes of behavior and value-systems other than those of 
one’s own group is to be attained” (pp. 23-4). 
  Notice that, while Herskovits claims that anthropological insights are of value for 
economists studying other cultures, but he does not explicitly go so far as to say that such 
insights might be useful in the study of our own culture.  Here, his criticism may be significantly 
extended. 
  As stated above, I interpret Herskovits’ criticism of economists’ neglect of anthropology 
as being grounded in the ideal that science should maximize its generality.  But economists who 
exclusively focus on our own culture do not share that ideal.  Herskovits remains vague about the 
disadvantages of being constrained by one’s culture in the study of one’s own culture.  
 
15 
  An anthropological criticism of economics will be much more powerful if it shows that 
anthropological insights are relevant to the study of the modern economy.  Hamilton (1991) 
indeed makes such a case.
9 
 
Herskovits’ Anthropologist as a “Specialist in Method” 
  Herskovits argues that anthropologists have been forced to develop as specialists in 
method, due to the danger of ethnocentrism: “The student who analyzes … [for example, 
economic aspects of] his own society, is so prone to accept as given the cultural matrix in which 
are lodged his data that he feels no need to subject this setting to any considerable analysis.  This 
can be a handicap, especially when generalizations having cross-cultural validity must be drawn; 
but it is also a short-cut for those studying their own culture.  Lacking this short-cut, the student 
of nonliterate societies must, however, before anything else establish the nature and the 
underlying sanctions of the institutions in the group he studies.  It is this fact that, presenting 
anthropologists with their greatest challenge, forced them to develop as specialists in method” 
(p.43). 
  While the anthropologist is in this sense a specialist in method, he cannot, of course, 
simultaneously be a specialist in all the aspects (economy, polity, literature, religion, etc.) of a 
society.  But those who do specialize in specific aspects of society have found it difficult to 
submit “their assumptions to scientific test by applying them to civilizations that are quite 
different from our own in terms of their historic past, their environmental setting, and their 
technological equipment… [T]he specialization of the anthropologist along methodological lines 
has enabled him to amass data of value for those who restrict their attention to specific fields of 
human activity in single cultures.  [Understanding this is] an important step in establishing the 
basis for a greater degree of mutual give-and-take between anthropologists and economists” 
(p.44). 
                                                    
9 Hamilton argues that the discipline of economics … should adopt the methods and attitudes as well as the data an 
analyses of anthropology into our perspectives on economic activity – that economics should be as sensitive to the 
folkviews and mythmaking of our own culture as anthropologists and others are to the folkviews of other peoples” 
and points to “the possibility that the economics that some anthropologists have doubt applying to ‘primitive’ 
economies, does not apply to an industrial economy either.  And there is the distinct possibility that some of the 
notions of the anthropologist fit an industrial society and that the simplistic market notions stemming from Adam 
Smith fit the fish and strawberry markets of non-industrial economies better than they fit the industrial economy in 
which they are held dearly” (Hamilton 1991, p.942).  
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Concluding Remarks: The Knight-Herskovits Debate in Methodological 
Perspective 
  Are we to interpret Knight’s and Herskovits’ opposing views in Kuhnian and/or in 
Lakatosian terms?  Knight’s and Herskovits’ stances can definitely be regarded as belonging to 
different paradigms in economics,
10 in the sense of “disciplinary matrices,”
11 because they differ 
on a number of fundatmental issues.  First, for Herskovits, all scientific theories, including 
economics, should be based on data, whereas for Knight, economic theory constitutes an 
exception among the social sciences in that it consists of induction from ‘a priori’ principles.  
Second, Herskovits has a strong belief, based on an ideal of universality of science, that 
economists should be interested in all economic systems, including non-modern ones; Knight, on 
the other hand, does not object to the neglect of non-modern economies among economists.  
Third,  because Herskovits aims at theories that describe real-world economic systems, which are 
embedded in communities and cultures, for him the socio-cultural context forms an integral part 
of the picture.  In contrast, Knight does not claim that economic theory is concerned with 
economic reality; rather, for Knight, economic theory concerns only the economic aspect of 
behavior – i.e., it studies the implications of rational choice while it takes preferences as given, 
thus ignoring the formation of preferences. 
  Clearly, these differences are so fundamental that they can be regarded as being 
‘paradigmatic’: They go beyond subtler distinctions captured in Lakatos’ concept of competing 
scientific research programs.
12  However, the Knight-Herskovits debate does not conform neatly 
to Kuhn’s portrayal of the dynamics of science: Nowhere is there a scientific revolution in sight; 
rather, opposing conceptions of economics similar to Knight’s and Herskovits’ coexisted before 
them and continue to coexist to date. 
  In both protagonists, it can be observed that a paradigm has a dual role.  It is the basis for 
scientific practice – even though scholars do not always practice what they preach.  At the same 
                                                    
10 It is clear from Herskovits’ criticisms that this debate is not merely a controversy between two scholars working in 
different disciplines.  Rather, these are opposing views on the methodology of economics. 
11 This is one of the two major interpretations of paradigm as explained by Kuhn (1970), the other one being 
“exemplar” (Argyrous 1992). 
12 Lakatos’ ideas about progressive and degenerating research programs (see Lakatos and Musgrave 1970) are not 
easily applied to the Knight-Herskovits debate; to do this would require an assessment of the historical development 
of actual economic research in the abstract-deductive and empirical-inductive traditions, which is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
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time, the paradigms is its adherent’s theoretical blinders.  Let me conclude this paper by 
illustrating the latter point.  Although Knight recognizes that anthropology is of some interest to 
economists, his asymmetrical assessment of the mutual benefits of increased interaction between 
economists and anthropologists –  economists would be more valuable to anthropologists than 
vice versa – conveys an image of epistemological arrogance.  He seems to ignore the existence 
of anthropological theories and he focuses almost exclusively on economic theory, so that he 
makes it seem that economics is mainly theoretical and anthropology mainly empirical.  
Herskovits, on the other hand, seems to be too rigid in his rejection of abstract reasoning (that 
does not aim at realism in a descriptive or a predictive sense).  What he seems to overlook is that 
there are many ways of enhancing our understanding of the “real world”, including indirect 
ways.  Deduction from abstract principles, though not directly related to facts, may lead to 
‘benchmark’ insights that may help us interpret a seemingly chaotic real world.  Moreover, there 
seems to be an inconsistency in Herskovits’ methodological stance in that he embraces the 
maximization principle, which cannot be justified using empirical data.  A methodological 
statement of Herskovits’ scientific practice would have to accommodate his use of the 
maximization principle and thus abandon, or at least qualify, his stated position that “findings 
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